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Abstract
This study highlights the characteristics of Small and Middle Entrepreneurs (SMEs) as a debtor of micro 
ﬁnance institution (MFI), whether as conventional or sharia type. The study was conducted by taking primary 
data including 30 debtors of conventional MFI and 29 debtors of Sharia MFI using a questionnaire. In 
the ﬁrst stage, the study established several indices to measure the religiosity level using Principal Component 
Analysis. Additionally, game ﬁeld experiments use in order to reveal the debtor’s risk preferences. At a later 
stage, the probit regression model used. This study found that debtors of sharia MFI is relatively more religious. 
There is also a fact that debtors from both types of MFI have the same risk preferences, risk lover. But debtors 
in sharia MFI have a relatively lower level one. So, in order to broaden the Sharia MFI inclution, the 
managers have to pay more attention to at least two other characteristics of SMEs; their age and the years 
of experience in business management.
Keywords: Micro Finance Institutions, Risk Preference, Religiosity
INTRODUCTION
Although microﬁnance institutions (read 
MFI) has been growing rapidly in many parts 
of the world since the last few decades, but there 
are still many people who do not have access to 
the products/services of this institution. Mix 
obstacles both in terms of demand and supply 
to explain this phenomenon. From the supply 
side, the presence and deployment location 
that is still not evenly distributed MFI causes 
people diﬃcult to reach potential customers 
its services is one reason access barriers.
Some research states that the distance 
(geographical distance) is an important factor 
that weakens the ﬁnancial access in some 
countries (Seep Network 2006), including in 
the United States (Petersen and Rajan, 2002). 
When considering a transaction between two 
agents -in the case between individuals or 
groups of individuals as consumers and micro-
ﬁnance institutions as producers, the eﬀect of 
distance translates into physical costs to be 
paid agents to be able to realize the transaction. 
Some literature explaining the mechanism 
of transmission distance on access to the 
credit markets both in terms of producers 
and consumers in several ways. In terms of 
microﬁnance institutions as producers, ﬁrst, 
there is a direct transaction costs, ie the cost 
of transport to provide ﬁnancial services to 
individual borrowers (consumer). In the 
competitive ﬁnancial markets, the cost is borne 
by the borrower in the form of screening a 
more intense and higher interest rates. The 
124  Maqdis: Jurnal Kajian Ekonomi Islam -Volume 1, Nomor 2, Juli-Desember 2016
second implication is the increase in the cost 
of monitoring: if the lender needs to gather 
information prior approval of the borrower 
(adverse selection), or monitoring the borrower 
after the loan is approved (moral hazard), 
during a visit to monitor. This in turn means 
tighter lending restrictions and the imposition 
of higher interest rates.
Meanwhile on the demand side of the 
borrower as a consumer, opportunistic behavior 
- namely choosing consumption rather than 
investment - tend to more easily arise as 
the greater the distance from microﬁnance 
institutions, because of the possibility of a 
lower detected (Presbitero, 2011). Shift the 
use of credit money from the agreed objectives 
will increase the possibility of termination of 
the credit. These results are very costly for 
individuals who generally do not have a bank 
account before joining the program and have 
the minimal information that makes their 
credit worthiness evaluation very diﬃcult.
The same is also in force in Indonesia. 
Although relatively more developed than 
other micro ﬁnance business entity (eg micro-
insurance), but the level of MFI service coverage 
is not optimal. There is still great potential to 
access more clients. In Arab countries alone, 
the gap in coverage is estimated at around 53 
million (Malkawi et al., 2011). This is caused 
partly by fundamental diﬀerences in the types 
of clients who take out a loan in the Middle 
East. Basically, a lot of potential Middle East 
clients implement Sharia law, which speciﬁcally 
classiﬁes usury on interest, as prohibited in 
economic transactions (Obaidullah, 2008). 
Therefore, a major component MFI interest, 
some researchers argue that many Middle 
Eastern people living in poverty do not 
participate in the credit program (Abdul-
Rahman, 2007, Dusuki, 2008). Presumably 
MFI coverage and range of services that have 
not yet reached its full potential, it would be 
signiﬁcantly more widespread in the region 
with the presence of Shariah-based MFI 
alternative (read Islamic MFI) (Dhumale and 
Sapcanin 1999 and Obaidullah, 2008).
With the particular characteristics of 
Islamic microﬁnance contracts that do not 
charge interest on the loan it can be said that 
Islamic microﬁnance is expected to appeal to 
people who are more religious. Consumers 
who are religious are basically beneﬁcial to both 
parties, both microﬁnance institutions (shari’a) 
as producer and (prospective) borrower 
as consumers. In terms of micro-ﬁnance 
institutions, in the context of lending model 
based on individual and group, religiosity 
(which is transformed into a form of behavior 
according to the guidelines of religion) the 
prospective borrower is an important indicator 
that is considered to be a proxy for social 
collateral (replaces physical collateral) as well as 
reduce the potential for moral hazard potential 
borrowers (Berggren, 2014).
In fact, although the majority of the 
population is Muslim, but access to Islamic MFI 
Muslim Indonesia is still limited. This can be 
referred to the number of MFIs per population 
ratio is still low. Theoretically, all ﬁnancial 
institutions, both banks and micro-ﬁnance, both 
conventional and Islamic inherently identiﬁed 
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with individuals who tend to avoid risk. Does 
this mean that we should also expect the level of 
public access to both types of these institutions 
to be similar? Clearly, Islamic loan structure and 
diﬀerent products and is governed by a contract 
diﬀerent from conventional loans. Islamic 
microﬁnance in the contract, when the contract 
with the borrower, Islamic MFI will bear some 
of the risk, provide borrowers with opportunities 
that are less risky overall.
In addition, there will be a diﬀerent 
motivation to choose access to one of the 
models on the other MFIs. For example, the 
debtor may choose to access the conventional 
MFI than to Islamic MFI for reasons of ease of 
accessibility or the need for speciﬁc products. 
If the proximity of the nearest bank branch 
or the suitability of the product is the main 
reason for choosing one over the other types 
of loans, we do not need to expect that level 
of access to services in both types of products 
are systematically MFI will be diﬀerent. The 
question is among the various determinants, 
then what is more dominant factors constrain 
access to this institution?. If the distance 
constraints were a major factor then of course 
the risk factor of religiosity and preference will 
not be able to provide information on access 
variation. Meanwhile, if the factor of religiosity 
and risk preferences are a major constraint then 
of BMT wherever located, all Muslims who tend 
to be risk-averse will have the same access to it. 
This paper tried to compare the characteristics 
of individual perpetrators UKMK factors are 
more dominant in determining access as the 
debtor to the MFI (S).
PREVIOUS STUDIES 
This section discusses several theories 
regarding the typical characteristics of MFIs 
mainly Islamic MFI which distinguishes it from 
conventional MFI. Besides tiu also continued 
with a discussion of the characteristics of 
individuals who belong to the dominant 
determining the decision to access, particularly 
in risk preferences.
Islamic MFI 
Islamic microﬁnance can be understood 
in the context of Islamic attitudes toward the 
distribution of wealth, ethics, and social and 
economic justice (Dhumale and Sapcanin, 
1999). Contrary to conventional micro-
ﬁnance, Shari’ah ﬁnance guided by the 
objectives of Shariah (maqashiddul syar’iyyah) 
is to assure that the wealth circulated to as many 
people, making sure that growth and equity 
promoting justice and social welfare (Dusuki, 
2008). There are four main guiding principles 
of Islamic ﬁnancing methods, and then played 
an important role in Islamic microﬁnance. 
The ﬁrst of these principles is the prohibition 
of interest in economic transactions. Several 
important part in the Qur’an relating to 
ﬁnancial regulation, and speciﬁcally for usury. 
Interpretation of usury has been contested in 
practice, with some identiﬁed as exploitative 
or excessive rates of interest, and others basing 
the deﬁnition of the concept of overall interest 
(Abdul Rahman, 2007).
In addition to prohibiting usury, the next 
principle is the idea of risk sharing between 
lenders and borrowers. This idea promotes the 
126  Maqdis: Jurnal Kajian Ekonomi Islam -Volume 1, Nomor 2, Juli-Desember 2016
distribution of income between the two sides 
during periods of positive and negative (El-Komi 
and Croson, 2011). When an MFI becomes 
partner of a business owner, it means that both 
borrowers and lenders have a strong interest in 
the success of the project (IFAD, 2012). Finally, 
the fourth principle of Islamic law stipulates that 
the money can only be used as a medium of 
exchange, and can not be used as an investment 
towards unproductive activities. At its core, 
Shariah MFIs rely on spiritual brotherhood and 
help each other ideas to encourage members to 
repay their loans, or to encourage others to assist 
their colleagues in paying their loans (Ahmed, 
2002). MFI Shari’ah also conﬁrmed jargon to 
customers that do not pay the debt ﬁnancing is 
considered sinful in Islam, which will motivate 
borrowers to repay their loans (Ahmed, 2002). 
Based on customers’ sanctions mechanism 
“rogue” varies between Islamic and conventional 
ﬁnance, customers of the type of risk-lovers tend 
to be attracted to the model of Islamic ﬁnance. 
Moreover, this doctrine also creates opportunity 
for the emergence of moral hazard potential 
customers of the type of risk-lovers. One possible 
reason why the customers of the type of risk-
lovers using Islamic microﬁnance services may 
be due to the availability of the opportunity to 
negotiate a petition ﬁled types of loans.
Risk Preferences
In developing countries, the risk is widespread 
mainly due to the potential for frequent 
unexpected shocks, and also the inability of 
poor people to provide insurance against these 
shocks (Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2007). Risks and 
uncertainties play an important role in almost 
every important economic decision. Because 
everyone is diﬀerent in how they make decisions 
that involve risk and uncertainty and because 
these diﬀerences are often described as diﬀerent 
attitudes to risk, then understand the preferences 
of the individual risk is a prerequisite for 
understanding economic behavior. Economists 
traditionally use the Expected Utility Theory 
(EUT) to analyze the actions of individuals 
when they are faced with the decision of the 
uncertainty (Leiberman, 2011). With the 
use of probability, the EUT is derived from 
variations in individual utility as a consequence 
of diﬀerent risk preferences (Leiberman, 2011). 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) found the 
EUT, rational decision makers will choose the 
outcome that oﬀers the highest utility.
In the context of micro-credit, Stiglitz 
(1990) introduced a model of ex ante moral 
hazard in microﬁnance. Model Stiglitz revealed 
that transfer the risk would increase overall 
welfare of borrowers who are members in the 
group. Vereshchagina et al. (2009) Further 
study is to explore the idea of risk in the 
context of the entrepreneur. The researchers 
developed the theory of entrepreneurial risk 
as endogenous variables to observe the risk 
preferences of employers. In their study, 
researchers found that poor entrepreneurs have 
a greater tendency to pursue projects that are 
relatively risky. Several other studies support 
this statement, argued that the entrepreneur 
embodies a set of preferences that encourage 
them to engage in risky behavior.
S i m i l a r l y,  C r e s s y  ( 2 0 0 0 )  a n d 
Polkovnichenko (2003) suggests that employers 
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may be less risk averse because they are 
relatively more capital or human capital 
because they are rich. While this assumption 
may apply to employers, it does not represent 
the borrower microﬁnance in developing 
countries. In a related study, Pearlman (2012) 
speciﬁcally deals with risk and selection of 
micro ﬁnance. By outlining a model that 
involves a degree of risk of the project and 
the ability of households to manage risk, the 
authors determined that the signiﬁcant risks 
in determining the participation of micro-
ﬁnance as a whole. Here, Pearlman (2011) 
states linkages of microﬁnance penetration 
rate low vulnerability (vulnerability) client, or 
diﬃculty adjusting their consumption patterns 
when faced with negative income shocks from 
time to time.
RESEARCH METHODS
To explore this issue, we revealed the risk 
preference and religiosity of respondents in 
a survey by questionnaire. The survey was 
conducted to obtain data related to identity, 
socio-economic and ﬁnancial status as well 
as customer-relationship between both the 
MFI; Islamic MFI and conventional MFI. 
conventional MFI customer survey results 
(conventional) and Islamic MFI (shari’a) that 
will be used in the comparative analysis of the 
trends of each customer in the context of risk 
preference and religiosity.
Data and Variable 
The main datasets for analysis is the 
primary data consisting of each of 30 (thirty) 
people on both MFI customers for a total of 
60 (sixty) respondents. Moreover, to see the 
eﬀects of gender, the female participants were 
included in the sample. As the main variable 
in the study, the deﬁnition and measurement 
of these two variables; risk preference and 
religiosity, should be set correctly. Therefore, 
in this study the tools that are used to refer to 
a set of questions in the survey questionnaire 
IFLS (Indonesian Family Live Survey) and 
sets of experimental research related to the 
behavior and attitudes of individuals related 
ﬁnancial aspects which has become a standard 
reference in various research-related behavior 
of individuals/households. Two main issues 
related to research attitudes and behavior of 
individuals in the ﬁnancial aspect of this is 
the preference of risk (risk-preference) and risk 
preferences (time-preference).
Risk Preferences Measurement
Risk preference as variables used in this 
research is in the context of comparative 
superlative. In other words, risk preference 
is measured from the level of love for the 
individual against ﬁnancial risk. Rational 
behind the use of these variables is the general 
trend of the homogeneity of client businesses 
against risks. The entrepreneur (pelaku 
UKMK) is considered likely to be more like 
the risk (risk-lovers). Therefore, this study tried 
to estimate the level of a love of risk itself (level 
of risk-lovers). In other words, the disclosure of 
risk preference in this study was not conducted 
with contradictory measurement of two 
extremes; hate (averse) or love (lovers) to risk.
To measure the level of risk-lovers is then 
used tools ﬁeld experiment using simulated 
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game related 6 number selection risky 
conditions (on a positive level). Riset for the 
sake of this, the level of risk-lover categorized 
into two types, low and high. The individual is 
said to have a risk level that is low-lover, if in a 
single game (ﬁrst time round) played, his.her 
choice will fall in numbers in the range of 2-4 
and a level of risk-lover that high, if the choice 
fell on a number in the range 5-6. The higher 
the number of individual choice, it can be 
concluded that the greater the degree of love for 
the individual against the risk. Then proceed 
by providing binary code, if categorized as low 
given the code 0 and if high given the code 1.
Muslim Religiosity Measurement
To measure the level of religiosity, used 
questions related to practice individual worship 
in the data characteristics of the individual/
household. In the questionnaire characteristics 
of individuals/households in IFLS4, the book 
section 3A TR, individuals (Muslims) TR13 
asked to answer questions about how many 
times they pray (shalat) every day. A study in the 
diﬀerent themes but in the context and the same 
variable (Gaduh, 2012) uses this data to validate 
the self-assessment of religiosity of respondents 
customer ﬁnancing Gaduh Arya (2012).
In addition, the questionnaire was also 
enriched by adding several questions related 
to other religious practices, such as the habit 
of charity and reading the Qur’an in the past 
week. The emphasis on this custom varied by a 
repetition of events represented by the question 
how many times charity and had been reading 
the Qur’an in the past week. Instead of using 
the variation in quantity, such as how much 
charity and many pages of reading the Qur’an. 
Thus, it was concluded that the more often an 
individual charity and reading the Qur’an in 
the past week, the individual was considered 
to be relatively more religious. Furthermore, 
measurement of the level of religiosity done in 
two ways. First, combine the three components 
of worship had been using PCA (Principal 
Component Analysis). This method generated 
from the constructs and level of religiosity of 
each individual parameter. Second, use the 
last three components separately. In this case 
also concluded that the greater the PCA scores 
of individual religiosity, the individual was 
considered to be relatively more religious. The 
individual characteristics of respondents in full 
can be seen in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Description of SME’s Respondent Characteristics as MFI Client
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Karakteristik ART      
Sex (1=pr, 0=lk) 59 0.6440678 0.4829047 0 1
Umur 59 44.32203 9.782886 28 67
Jumlah_ART 59 4.59322 2.393372 1 16
Status_RT (1=KRT, 0=IRT) 59 0.3559322 0.4829047 0 1
pca_rel 59 6.631419 3.206021 1.72 18.32
Baca_Al-Qur’an 59 2.338983 2.418393 0 7
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Risk_lover (1=Yes, 0=No) 42 0.6428571 0.4849656 0 1
Konsistensi (1=Yes, 0=No) 59 0.8305085 0.378406 0 1
Karakteristik Usaha      
Lama_usaha 59 12.47458 10.52478 1 46
Peng_usaha (1=Yes, 0=No) 59 0.8965517 0.3072033 0 1
Omset_usaha 59 11.35424 10.87641 0 45
Karakteristik LKM      
lkm (1=lkm, 0=Islamic MFI) 59 0.5084746 0.5042195 0 1
Jarak 59 3.296102 3.902471 0.005 15
Diantar (1=Yes, 0=No) 59 0.5932203 0.4954498 0 1
Temu (1=Yes, 0=No) 59 0.2542373 0.4391693 0 1
Pemb_lain (1=Yes, 0=No) 59 0.2881356 0.4567821 0 1
Sources: Survey data processed
Estimation Method
To estimate the determinants of access to 
ﬁnance both the Islamic MFI and conventional 
MFI of various socio-economic conditions 
of the respondents, used two analyzes, the 
description and multivariate analysis. Analysis 
is done by displaying the description of the facts 
mean personal characteristics, operations and 
relationship with an MFI of individuals of both 
types of MFIs. This descriptive analysis gives a 
preliminary description of the similarities and 
diﬀerences of customers on both the type of 
MFI earlier than all of the characteristics that 
delivered earlier. Furthermore, multivariate 
analyzes were performed by using an 
econometric model will determine whether 
the similarities and diﬀerences earlier, means 
(signiﬁcant) statistically. Econometric model 
used in the form of linear probability estimation 
(probit regression). In the linear probability 
function, the dependent variable is a binary 
variable that takes the value of zero or one. 
The model in question can be seen from the 
following equation below.
ihllihiii LHXP  
Where variable iX  is the vector of personal 
characteristics and household members (ART) 
individuals i , who in addition to revealing 
the main variable risk preferences and status 
religiosity also include age, gender (sex), 
number of ART and the status of RT. While 
hiH it is a vector of characteristics of the i  
individual-owned enterprises covering a long 
eﬀort, the turnover of the business, previous 
business experience and business sectors. While
liL  it is a vector of characteristics of the MFIs 
that became a source of ﬁnancing i individual 
and the i  individual relationships that include how 
long got home ﬁnancing and the distance to the 
MFI (S), the installment payment, regular meetings 
and the ﬁnancing status of other MFIs today.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section presents the results of a data 
description and analysis of the estimation 
performed by multivariate analysis. Multivariate 
analysis is done by using an econometric model 
described in the previous section.
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Description Analysis Characteristics of 
Respondents
Graﬁk 1 below provides information on 
the personal characteristics of the oﬀender 
respondents UKMK sebagai ﬁnancing 
customers for each type of MFI.
Sources: Survey data processed
Grafik 1. Individual SME Actor Characteristics
Based on survey data obtained, it appears 
that in terms of age, the average customer 
ﬁnancing on Islamic MFI relatively older than 
on conventional MFI customer ﬁnancing. The 
average of SME actors as customers Islamic 
MFI are 45.7 years old, while the average 
customer of conventional MFI are 42.86 years 
old. Meanwhile, the facts of the main variables 
which are the main concern of this research; the 
risk preference and religiosity, in conformity 
with the initial hypothesis. Scores of both 
variables referred to table above reveals that it 
is indeed SME actor as Islamic MFI customer 
are more likely to avoid risks and also tend 
to be more religious. Instead the customers 
conventional MFI relatively risk-lovers and 
have lower levels of religiosity. One thing that 
is actually quite surprising from a glance at 
the data readout time variable-preference is 
evidently actors Islamic MFI, SME actor are 
relatively prefer to discount the time than 
SME actors in conventional MFI. It may be 
that there are two (2) perspective explanation 
of this, First, from a negative perspective, it is 
the customer Islamic MFI relatively impatient 
and inconsistent ﬁnancial aspects. Secondly, 
from a positive perspective, it could be also 
perpetrators of SME actor as Islamic MFI 
customers relatively better understand the 
concept of time value of money. Furthermore, 
graﬁk 2 below gives details of the characteristics 
of the respondent’s business as customer 
ﬁnancing SME actors and their relationships 
with each type of MFI.
Sources: Survey data processed
Grafik 2. Business Characteristics and MFI-SME Actor 
Relations
Based on survey data obtained, it appears 
that the perpetrators of the business aspects 
of SME actor both in the number of workers, 
managers and monthly turnover, conventional 
MFI customers are relatively better than 
in Islamic MFI customers.. Average of 
conventional MFI clients manage the business, 
in case the KRT (Head of Household) as the 
main organizer, employ more and bigger 
turnover. Meanwhile, the fact of the distance of 
a residence with oﬃces showed that the average 
MFI MFI clients in this relatively remote. On 
the other hand, was on the side of a relationship 
with an MFI, although relatively more SME 
actors as customer of Islamic MFI s have an 
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alternative ﬁnancing on other (micro) ﬁnancial 
institutions than SME actors as customer of 
conventional MFI, but they are still regularly 
attended a meeting with the manager od 
Islamic MFI.
Multivariate Analysis
Processed probit regression showed that 
the relationship between choices to become a 
conventional MFI customers with risk-lover 
levels showed a consistent pattern with the 
previously hypothesis. Relationships direction 
(positive) both variables and their signiﬁcance 
revealed the fact that customer ﬁnancing at 
conventional MFI relatively more love than 
the risk of customer ﬁnancing to Islamic 
MFI. In other words, the concept underlying 
the practice of shariah ﬁnancial institutions, 
in general, aims surely, not speculation. 
Meanwhile, it also revealed the fact that 
although the relationship status with access 
religiosity have a sign - (negative), according to 
the hypothesis. It is becoming an interesting fact 
the ﬁrst to be questioned, Suspected status to 
two main variables, namely the risk preferences 
or religiosity itself, are also related and level 
determined by the individual characteristics of 
the perpetrator SME actor itself.
Surprisingly, the study’s ﬁndings reveal 
diﬀerent things with the initial allegations. 
Figure 1 below shows that the love of the risk of 
SME perpetrators sought to be increased with 
age (umur). So that, in turn, is increasing the 
age will lead to the choice to become customers 
of conventional MFI, not Islamic MFI one. 
Indeed, when both these variables interacted, 
then the new variable relationship was the 
result of interaction with access to conventional 
MFI showed a positive direction, although not 
signiﬁcant at the 10% level though.
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Sources: Survey data processed
Figure 1. Margin Probability: Correlation of Risk 
Preferences-Age
Robustness Test
Furthermore, to test the sensitivity 
(robustness-test) mode, then a variety of 
other variables entered into the model as a 
control. If the presence of other variables in 
the model will not change the direction and 
signiﬁcantly of relationship patterns among 
the main variable as in the previous model, it 
can be concluded that the pattern was a steady 
relationship (robust). In the third model, the 
relationship status of religiosity and love of 
risk with the choice of type MFI, has the sign 
(direction) in accordance with the model of 
the previous one. But as interesting note, the 
pattern of the relationship between religiosity 
status with access to ﬁnancing to conventional 
MFI, increased signiﬁcance
Role of Age and Gender
n ﬁgure 2 below, the relationship between 
the main variables - the status of religiosity and 
love of risk with MFIs --- types to be tested 
(controlled) by dividing the data by age and 
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gender perpetrators of SMEs. The ﬁrst box, 
which is located on the upper left in the image, 
showing the role of the control variables of 
age before diinterkasikan the gender variable. 
It appears that the main variable relationships 
increases with age. In other words, the 
probability (likelihood) between risk-lover 
level with the choice of a customer turns to 
conventional MFI, increase as the same way 
with the age of SME actor. The second box, 
which is located at the upper right in the 
picture, then try to look at the role of gender 
in these relations. There was no signiﬁcantly 
diﬀerentiation in the relation between the 
main variable which based on gender. Both 
individual men and women have the same 
tendency in relations earlier. It reinforced by 
the third picture on the box, which is located 
at the bottom center of the image. The third 
box is the gender diﬀerential margin, which 
tends to show a horizontal pattern.
On the average, the aging of the gender 
did not show an increase in the magnitude of 
the probability coeﬃcient as a customer option 
conventional MFI signiﬁcantly. Research 
shows that the increase in the probability of 
selection of a customer conventional MFI of 
SME actors only an average of 0.005 points 
for each additional (margin) of 5 years of age 
or 0.0001 point for each additional (margin) 
1 year of age in a diﬀerent gender ( female 
gender as a benchmark = 1).
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Figure 2. Probability Margin of Correlation between Main Variables Controlled by Age and Gender
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At the age of 25 years, the probability 
coeﬃcient for 0077 into 0096 at the age of 
only 45 years. Analogous to the concept of 
elasticity, the relationship is quite inelastic, 
with a coeﬃcient of less than 1. Where 
each increment of 100% units (1 year) age 
at diﬀerent gender would only increase 
the probability of a customer to become 
conventional MFI customer by 10% only.
Role of Years of Managing Business and Gender
In ﬁgure 3 below, the relationship between 
the main variables - the status of religiosity 
and love of risk with the choice of the type of 
MFI --- will be tested (controlled) by dividing 
the data by age and gender of the individual. 
The ﬁrst box, which is located on the upper 
left in the image, showing the role of the old 
variable control eﬀorts (lama_ush) before 
diinteraksikan the gender variable. It appears 
that the main variable relationships increases 
with age. In other words, the relation between 
the probability (likelihood) between risk-lover 
level with the choice to become conventional 
MFI customer increase as the same way of SME 
actor’s years of managing business.
The second box, which is located at the 
upper right in the picture, try to look at the 
role of gender in these relations. There was no 
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the relation between 
the main variable was based on gender. Both 
individual men and women have the same 
tendency in relations earlier. It showed by the 
third of the picture on the box, which is located 
at the bottom center of the image. The third 
box is a diﬀerential margin of gender, tend to 
exhibit an inverse U-shaped pattern (inverted 
U-shaped). Added long years in the business 
management in diﬀerent gender showed 
increased probability coeﬃcient magnitude as 
a customer option conventional MFI at one 
point of the year and then declined again after 
next year signiﬁcantly.
Research shows that the increase in 
the probability of selection of a customer 
conventional MFI an average of 0.01 points 
for each additional (margin) 5 year old 
business management or 0.001 points for 
each additional (margin) 1 year old business 
management at diﬀerent gender to achieving 
year on year to 11 and to 12 and then 
subsequently decreased to an average of -0012 
point for each additional (margin) of 5 years or 
-0.0012 point for each additional (margin) 1 
year. In the old business management during 
the ﬁrst 10 years, the probability coeﬃcient 
increased choice conventional MFI of 0144 
amounted to Rp 0164 or an increase of 6.76% 
or 0.67% (nearly 1%) every year. Analogous 
to the concept of elasticity, the relationship 
is relatively closer to unitary elastic, with a 
coeﬃcient close to 1. Where each increment 
of 100% units (1 year) age at diﬀerent gender 
will also increase the probability of a customer 
conventional MFI 67% or close to 100% as 
well.
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Figure 3. Probability Margin of Correlation between Main Variables Controlled by Years of Managing Business 
and Gender
CONCLUSIONS
Probit regression estimation results showed 
some interesting and surprising conclusions 
also. Perpetrators of SMEs with a relatively 
higher level of risk loving, have a greater 
probability to take a loan on conventional 
MFI. These results are consistent with the 
null hypothesis that there are diﬀerences in 
the level of risk preferences between Islamic 
and conventional borrowers. This hypothesis 
comes from the idea that risk is shared (equally 
shared) between SME actors and MFI in the 
production sharia sharing contract. Because the 
risk is shared in this situation, the borrower will 
bear fewer risks in their business management.
Perpetrators of SMEs are relatively more 
religious also tend to take loans on Islamic 
MFI. This result is not too surprising, since 
the main justiﬁcation for the proliferation of 
Islamic microﬁnance is to provide a method 
of ﬁnancing for religious individuals without 
charging interest. Along with this idea, the 
research results show intuitively intuitively 
that Islamic MFI will attract people who are 
relatively more religious (Dutta and Magableh 
2004, Abdul Rahman, 2007 and Ashraf, 2010). 
Surprisingly, it turns out the perpetrators of 
SME actor relatively more old age tend to take 
loans on conventional MFI. Although at ﬁrst 
glance analysis found no signiﬁcant relationship 
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between age and status of religiosity, but this 
rising tickle questions related to the age of the 
perpetrator SME actor relationship with his 
choice to become a particular MFI clients. Why 
is getting older a SME actors, the options tend 
to conventional MFI?.
At ﬁrst when the perpetrator of SME actor 
are grouped by gender (sex) alone, did not 
have an impact on the relationships among 
the major variables earlier. Both individual 
men and women have the same tendency in 
the relationships among the major variables, 
both in terms of risk preference and religiosity 
to the loan options to conventional MFI. But 
after that relationship is tested by incorporating 
several additional variables (control) in 
the form of a personal characteristic; age 
and characteristic of business; old business 
management (variable sex encounters with 
other characteristic variables).
The ﬁndings apparently found an interesting 
relationship patterns patterned U-inverse 
(inverted U-shaped form) between the old 
(“ﬂying hours”) perpetrators of SME actor 
between gender (sex) in managing the business 
with conventional MFI choice. To the point 
boundary (threshold) long years of business 
management, female sex oﬀenders SMEs tend to 
take loans at conventional MFI. But after a year, 
instead turned into tend to take loans on Islamic 
MFI. It seems that women tend to be more 
religious with age which inﬂuence his choice of 
the type of MFI, ie Islamic MFI. Although the 
processing of data generally indicates patterns 
of relationship direction (positive) between age 
with conventional MFI option, but partially 
(when the data break downed) showed several 
diﬀerent trends. It is possible that women tend 
to be more religious with age and old business 
management. This in turn implies Islamic MFI 
important that managers be more careful in 
scrutinizing the client proﬁle.
There are at least three important 
characteristics of the oﬀender SME actor, 
both in terms of business characteristics The 
characteristics of self and the relationship pattern 
SME actor with their choice of MFI type, such 
as age, years of ,managing business (years of 
experience) and gender. On the other hand, it 
could be a guide for managers in conducting 
mapping future developmen of Islamic MFI.
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